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This thesis studies the relationship between democracy and government consumption, through 
the lenses of the median voter model of democratic redistribution developed by Meltzer and 
Richard. Taking a large sample covering countries across all regions of the world for the 1960-
2017 period, I estimate a positive effect of democratization on government consumption, 
controlling for country and year fixed effects. However, these results are not robust, as high 
levels of significance are not retained once I take the dynamics of government consumption and 
the Nickel bias into account. Given potential issues of endogeneity, I also carry out a two-stage 
least squares (2SLS) strategy, by using regional levels of democracy as an instrument, and my 
results do not change substantively. The lack of definitive conclusions arising from my 
empirical analysis suggests the relationship between democracies and government consumption 
may be more ambiguous than the median voter model of redistribution implies. If, for instance, 
democracy is “captured” by the elites, levels of redistribution might not be determined by the 
newly enfranchised segments of the population. Thus, I also discuss some of the reasons why 
recently democratized nations should not necessarily be expected to increase their levels of 
government consumption.  
Resumo 
Nesta tese, estuda-se a relação entre democracia e consumo público, tendo em conta o modelo 
do eleitor mediano num contexto de redistribuição democrática, desenvolvido por Meltzer and 
Richard. Considerando uma amostra alargada de países de todas as regiões do mundo para o 
período 1960-2017, estimo um impacto positivo da democratização no consumo público, 
controlando os efeitos fixos ao nível do país e ano. Contudo, estes resultados não são robustos, 
já que os elevados níveis de significância não se mantêm uma vez considerados as dinâmicas 
do consumo público e o problema do enviesamento de Nickel. Dada a potencial existência de 
endogeneidade, levo também a cabo uma estratégia de mínimos quadrados em dois estágios 
(2SLS), usando níveis regionais de democracia como variáveis instrumentais e os meus 
resultados não se alteram substancialmente. A falta de conclusões definitivas da minha análise 
empírica sugere que a relação entre democracias e consumo público poderá ser mais ambígua 
do que o modelo do eleitor mediano presume. Se, por exemplo, uma democracia for 
“controlada” pela elites, os níveis de redistribuição poderão não ser determinados pelos 
segmentos da população que acabaram de conquistar poder politico. Assim, discuto também 
algumas das razões pelas quais não se deverão necessariamente verificar aumentos do consumo 
público em nações recentemente democratizadas. 
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The world has faced dramatic political and economic changes over the last two 
centuries. From absolutist monarchies and subsistence levels of development to democratic 
republics and previously unimaginable standards of living, no early 19th century citizen could 
have dreamed of the giant leap humankind was about to take. And, oddly enough, explaining 
this phenomenon nowadays remains just as hard as it was to predict it back then. Indeed, some 
theories attribute political changes to the unprecedented levels of economic growth. According 
to the Modernization Theory, economic development, with all its associated facets – 
industrialization, urbanization, education – has triggered the worldwide observed transitions 
from autocratic regimes to democracies1. Conversely, democratic regimes have been pointed 
out as a catalyst for economic development, as leaders responding to popular demands should 
be more likely to enact economic liberalization reforms2. Authors such as Milton Friedman, on 
the other hand, have claimed that both political and economic freedoms tend to reinforce each 
other3. To sum up, should we expect increases in standards of living to generate democratization 
processes? Should we expect an acceleration of economic growth once a country democratizes? 
These are some of the most important questions in political economy. 
 The debate on the virtues and shortcomings of democracies precedes the observed 
historical transformations, however. Plato deemed democracy the second worst form of 
political organization, after tyranny, whereas Aristotle, though less sceptical, believed that the 
success of a democratic regime was conditional on the ability of the electorate not to succumb 
to demagoguery. In the first half of the 19th century, Tocqueville praised the ascent of 
democracy in the United States, but also warned against the emerging risk of a “tyranny of the 
majority”. More recent discussions on the relationship between political and economic 
institutions are thus not new, but have, instead, built upon a secular debate, from which 
definitive conclusions have not been reached. 
Given the broad spectrum of mechanisms underlying these questions, any fruitful 
analysis must necessarily start by focusing on some of its narrower aspects. In fact, many 
studies of the economic impact of democratic regimes have examined the relationship between 
political freedom and policy making. If democratic leaders tend to adopt policies different from 
those adopted by autocratic counterparts, then there may be a connection between political 
                                                             
1 See Lipset (1959). See Acemoglu et al. (2009) for a dissenting view. 
2 See Acemoglu et al. (2019) for an empirical analysis of the effect of democracy on growth. 
3 See Friedman (1962). 
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regimes and economic outcomes. In this regard, Meltzer and Richard’s (1981) seminal model 
of redistribution stands out as one of the most influential theoretical depictions of this potential 
relationship. This model distinguishes democracies from autocracies by the share of the 
population voting on policy matters. As democratizations take place, poorer segments of the 
population gain political voice and, given the model’s assumptions, higher rates of distortionary 
taxation are chosen to finance a redistribution scheme. Such a result could have deep 
implications. First, we should expect the size of government, as measured by its expenditures, 
to increase after a democratization process. Second, if democracies redistribute more, then we 
should also expect inequality to decrease, ceteris paribus. Other effects could be considered as 
well. Distortionary taxation weighs on economic growth and therefore democracy could hurt 
economic development4. If, on the other hand, income is redistributed mainly through the 
provision of public goods, the effect on growth could be less clear. At any rate, all these 
theoretical results rely on the validity of the aforementioned model and, though a logical chain 
of mechanisms is provided, its underlying assumptions may not necessarily correspond to 
reality. Moreover, empirical evidence on the topic is not clear either. Despite all the past 
observed worldwide transitions to democracy and the rising pervasiveness of public spending, 
we cannot confidently predict whether sudden democratic shocks in dictatorships as diverse as 
Belarus, Egypt or Brunei would induce higher levels of redistribution in those countries. To be 
sure, some democratization processes have been associated with increases in redistribution. The 
extension of voting rights in some Western European nations, such as the United Kingdom, 
France or Sweden, during the 19th and early 20th century, for instance, preceded the 
implementation of redistributive programs. And yet, many empirical analyses tend to report 
inconclusive results. These studies have often focused on total government spending or 
revenue, while others disaggregate spending and focus, for example, on public education or 
social security schemes. Although some exceptions exist, less attention has been given to the 
impact of democracy on redistribution through the overall public provision of goods and 
services.  
I aim at filling that gap by estimating the effect of democracy on government final 
consumption for a sample of 191 countries around the world in the period 1960 – 2017. In that 
respect, I take the 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦2 continuous measure of democracy from the POLITY IV dataset, as 
well as a binary indicator from Acemoglu et al. (2019) and estimate a positive impact of 
democracy on government consumption, using both country and year fixed effects. However, 
                                                             
4 See Barro (1996). 
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my results lose some significance once I introduce a GMM estimator controlling for the bias 
that arises in a dynamic panel context with a fixed effects transformation. I also exploit the fact 
that democratizations tend to occur in regional waves5, by taking an instrumental variable, 
denoting regional levels of democracy, to control for the potential endogeneity arising from the 
democracy variable of interest. Significant results are also not entirely guaranteed once this 
strategy is implemented. Indeed, although I show some evidence that democratizations lead to 
higher levels of government consumption, my results should be interpreted with caution, as the 
theoretical relationship under consideration is not without a few caveats. Maybe democracies 
are “captured” by wealthy minorities that manage to exert their power over political parties and 
impose their preferences for lower public consumption. Perhaps voting decisions are mainly 
guided by ideology and conceptions of fairness rather than individual self-interest. I further 
discuss these and some other reasons why Meltzer and Richard’s (1981) model might not 
perfectly describe the redistributive effects of a democratization process in general and the 
effect of democracy on government consumption in particular.    
This thesis is thus organized as follows. In section 2, I survey some of the relevant 
empirical literature on the effects of democracy on levels of redistribution. In section 3, I present 
the benchmark model, by Meltzer and Richard, as well as its main assumptions and derive its 
final result, which is afterwards empirically tested. Section 4 deals with the implemented 
econometric strategy and, in section 5, a description of all used data and their sources is 
provided. In the following section, I show the results of my estimation procedures. Then, in 
section 7, I discuss some of the arguments which could potentially explain why the results of 
my empirical analysis are not as robust as the model predicts. Finally, section 8 concludes.     
Literature Review 
I develop an analysis of the relationship between democratizations and government 
consumption through the lenses of Meltzer and Richard’s (1981) model, which will be 
described in detail in the following section. Other theoretical models in the literature (see 
Roberts 1977, Romer 1975) have yielded similar mechanisms and outcomes. In this section, I 
will instead focus on a body of relevant empirical studies which have shed light on the fiscal 
policy implications of transitions to democracy. 
                                                             
5 See Huntington (1991). 
9 
 
There is, in fact, a vast set of empirical investigations of this relationship using data 
across different regions and time periods. Different estimation techniques, as well as measures 
of redistribution have also been employed.  
Indeed, many historical studies have, for instance, examined how expansions of political 
rights in some Western countries in the 19th and early 20th centuries have affected tax policy. 
Aidt, Dutta and Loukoianova (2006) and Aidt and Jensen (2009) find a positive and robust 
effect of suffrage expansion on government size using a sample of, respectively, 12 and 10 
Western European nations. However, the former do not tackle endogeneity concerns and the 
latter’s results fail to remain significant after an instrumental variable strategy is implemented. 
Aidt and Jensen (2013), on the other hand, find a positive and significant impact on government 
spending per capita and as a share of GDP for a sample of 8 Western European countries, even 
after using an instrument, but their overall results are not robust, as the effect on government 
revenue is not significant.  
Scheve and Stasavage (2010, 2012) focus, instead, on the impact of mass warfare on tax 
policy, but also estimate the role that the expansion of suffrage might have played. In the first 
study, they find a positive and statistically significant relationship between universal male 
suffrage and tax progressivity, as measured by top marginal rates of income tax on a group of 
8 OECD countries in the period 1900 – 1930. Yet, these results do not hold to a longer-term 
regression analysis for the same group of countries using pooled OLS estimates for the period 
1850 – 1970. In the second study, the existence of competitive elections is also added as a 
variable of interest, but a significant relationship between political rights and top marginal rates 
of inheritance taxation is not found for a group of 6 developed nations in the 1816 – 2000 
period. The introduction of female suffrage throughout this period has also been analysed as a 
potential determinant of increases in government size. Lindert (1994) finds that social insurance 
through government was more favoured in democracies which led the way in providing women 
with voting rights.  
Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) take a different, more qualitative, approach, by 
showcasing how expansions of suffrage preceded large scale increases of redistribution 
programmes in Great Britain, France, Germany and Sweden, throughout the 19th and the first 
half of the 20th centuries. 
An alternative set of studies exploits the high degree of variation of political rights in 
Latin America during the last decades of the 20th century. These investigations tend to focus 
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not only on the magnitude, but mostly on the different forms of redistribution that 
democratizations may impact on. In this regard, Huber and Stephens (2012) take a panel dataset 
of 18 Latin American countries for 1970 – 2007 and use the cumulative number of years each 
country has been democratic as the variable of interest, to assess the impact of democratic 
stability in a pooled OLS regression without fixed effects. They find a positive effect on 
education, healthcare and welfare spending. Interestingly, they also find that education 
spending is more sensitive to short term changes in political conditions. Kaufman and Segura-
Ubiergo (2001) also look at different forms of redistribution, but use a dichotomous measure 
of democracy instead, as well as a panel correction model controlling for country and year fixed 
effects. Taking data for 14 Latin American countries in 1973 – 1997, they find a positive effect 
of democratization on education and healthcare spending and a negative effect on welfare 
spending.  
Other studies, such as Brown and Hunter (1999), examine the interaction between 
democracy and the level and growth rates of GDP per capita, using a first differences approach 
for the outcome variable. Taking the same dichotomous measure for democracy, they find a 
positive impact of democratization on social spending, especially at low levels of income. 
Additionally, they also find that, unlike democracies, autocracies tend to curtail social spending 
as GDP growth rates decline.  
Other regions are also studied, for example, by Profeta and Scabrosetti (2010). They 
estimate the impact of democratization not only for Latin American countries, but also taking 
some Asian and Eastern European nations into account. Considering the 1990 – 2004 period 
and using pooled OLS regressions, they find a positive and robust effect of democratization on 
tax revenues and their results hold to region specific analyses. However, their findings for some 
types of taxation are more ambiguous, as they fail to uncover any significant effect of 
democracy on social security contributions. 
Finally, there are also some studies covering vast groups of countries across all regions 
in the world, though no definitive results are found either. Acemoglu et al. (2013) take a large 
dataset of 184 countries from 1960 to 2010 and estimate a positive and significant effect of 
democratization on tax revenue and total government revenue, whereas Mulligan et al. (2004) 
do not find significant results when covering a similarly large set of countries. There are a few 
differences regarding the included countries, the covered time period and the used measures of 
government size, but the contrasting results are likely to be driven by the different used 
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empirical strategies. Indeed, the former control for country and time fixed effects as well as the 
dynamics of the dependent variables. The latter, on the other hand, take country averages 
throughout the considered 1960 – 1990 period and run cross-sectional regressions.  
Kammas and Sarantides (2018) use a different approach when measuring redistribution 
for a sample of 174 countries. Rather than indicators of government spending or revenues, the 
used outcome variable is given by the difference between market income and disposable income 
gini coefficients. Thus, this analysis allows for the evaluation of the effective fiscal 
redistribution generated by democratizations. They find, counterintuitively, that dictatorships 
have a positive and significant effect on this measure of redistribution. Such a relationship 
could, arguably, be explained by a higher preference of autocratic leaders for redistribution 
through cash transfers, rather than through the provision of public goods, which are not 
accounted for in this measure of redistribution.  
Given my focus on government consumption, an additional reference should be made 
to Mulligan et al. (2004), as this is one of the measures of fiscal policy they consider in their 
empirical analysis. They do not find a significant effect of democratization on this measure, but 
their results might be driven by their chosen cross-sectional specification, which does not take 
country specific factors into account. In the econometric specification section, I describe my 
empirical strategy and explain why the choices I make for my model may allow for a better 
depiction of the potential relationship between democracies and public consumption.                
Anyway, a consensus regarding the hypothesis that democratizations induce higher 
levels of redistribution is far from being reached, as the divergence of results summarized above 
can easily attest. Existing data have yielded ambiguous findings and therefore failed to robustly 
validate Meltzer and Richard’s proposition. Moreover, few of these studies credibly tackle 
endogeneity issues, making it harder to derive causal interpretations out of their conclusions. 
In the following section, I describe the benchmark model before testing it empirically later 
ahead.   
Benchmark Model 
In this section I introduce Meltzer and Richard’s (1981) seminal study, which shows 
how, under a set of assumptions on individual behaviour, the form of redistribution and the 
political process, democratizations would lead to increases in government size. They develop a 
parsimonious general equilibrium model where a flat tax is imposed on each individual’s labor 
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income and collected funds are redistributed equally over the population via lump sum transfers. 
The results of the model are not limited to the connection between democracies and 
redistribution, though I only focus on that aspect. 
The first step in understanding Meltzer and Richard’s argument lies on the process 
through which tax rates are established in the model. Indeed, imposed rates are determined by 
a voting rule or, in other words, an institutionalized political process. The differences between 
autocracies and democracies are thus conceptualized, in this framework, by the underlying 
differences in voting rules. Under autocratic regimes tax policy is determined by a dictator who 
responds to a small economic elite supporting him, whereas in democracies the model assumes 
universal suffrage with majority rule. Therefore, a change in the voting rule associated with the 
democratic transition would imply a change in the politically determined tax rate. 
The choices made under each voting rule are those of a decisive voter. Given the 
unimodality of the policy under vote and assumed majority rule, the median voter will be the 
decisive voter6. As a democratization process takes the shape of an extension of the franchise 
towards the left in the income distribution, i.e. towards poorer segments of the population, the 
new relevant median voter will be less well-off. This means that the impact of a democratization 
on the chosen tax rate and therefore on government size can be derived by the relationship 
between an individual’s income and his preferred tax rate. 
In the model, an individual’s earned income 𝑦 is a function of his productivity 𝑥 and the amount 
of time devoted to labor 𝑛, which depends on productivity itself, as shown below. 
𝑦(𝑥) = 𝑥𝑛(𝑥) (1) 
There are no savings and thus consumption equals disposable income, which, taking the 
redistribution process into account, becomes 
𝑐(𝑥) = (1 − 𝑡)𝑛𝑥 + 𝑟 (2) 
, where 𝑟 denotes the lump sum transfer and 𝑡 the tax rate imposed on labor income. 
Individuals care not only about consumption, but about leisure as well, and maximize 
their utility function subject to a constraint on their one-unit time endowment, devoted either to 
labor or leisure, as follows 
                                                             





𝑈(𝑐, 𝑙) = max
𝑛Є[0,1]
𝑈[(1 − 𝑡)𝑛𝑥 + 𝑟, 1 − 𝑛] . (3) 
The first order condition 
0 =  
𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝑛
= 𝑈𝑐[(1 − 𝑡)𝑛𝑥 + 𝑟, 1 − 𝑛]𝑥(1 − 𝑡) −  𝑈𝑙[(1 − 𝑡)𝑛𝑥 + 𝑟, 1 − 𝑛] (4) 
determines the optimal labor choice, 𝑛[𝑟, 𝑥(1 − 𝑡)] that becomes a function of the lump sum 
transfer and disposable income, which in turn depends on productivity and the tax rate. The 
utility function is assumed to be strictly concave for both consumption and leisure, thus 
ensuring that the first order condition derived above yields a maximum7. 
There are individuals for whom optimal 𝑛 = 0. From the first order condition we know 
that those with productivity lower or equal to  
𝑥0 =
𝑈𝑙(𝑟, 1)
𝑈𝑐(𝑟, 1)(1 − 𝑡)
(5) 
will prefer not to work and subsist on the transfer 𝑟. 
By assumption, both consumption and leisure are normal goods. This can be shown to 
be sufficient for a unique tax rate equilibrium to exist8. Moreover, it also implies that the tax 
rate has a distortionary effect on the choice of labor9. Simply put, as the tax rate increases, 
individuals will work less. 
When it comes to the political process, each individual prefers his own optimal tax rate. 
In this regard, the model has two important features. First, the government budget is balanced 
so that the total amount of collected taxes must fully finance the transfers, as follows.  
𝑡?̅? = 𝑟 (6) 
Second, individuals take the labor disincentive effect of taxation into account when choosing a 
tax rate. Collected funds are dependent on total production, which is in turn dependent on labor 
choices. Since the amount of time devoted to labor is a negative function of the tax rate, so is 
total production. 
                                                             
7 The second-order condition is given by 
𝜕2𝑈
𝜕𝑛2
= 𝐷 = 𝑈𝑐𝑐𝑥
2(1 − 𝑡)2 − 2𝑈𝑐𝑙𝑥(1 − 𝑡) + 𝑈𝑙𝑙 < 0. 
8 See Meltzer and Richard (1981), p.918,919 
9 See Meltzer and Richard (1981), p.920 
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The optimal tax rate is that which maximizes an individual’s disposable income. The 
decisive voter’s disposable income will be given by 
(1 − 𝑡)𝑦𝑑 + 𝑡?̅? (7) 
, where 𝑦𝑑 denotes his disposable income. 




− 𝑦𝑑 = 0 (8) 
There can be no negative taxes. Moreover, the distortionary effect on labor implies that 
there is also an upper bound lower than 100% on the chosen rate defined by the preferences of 
individuals who do not work. Therefore, given the negative sign of the above derivative, the 
chosen tax rate becomes a negative function of the decisive voter’s income. Besides, the tax 
rate will be positive, provided the decisive voter is below average income, that is, provided 
𝑦𝑑 < 𝑦. 
It now becomes straightforward that an enfranchisement of poorer segments of the 
population would, within this framework, induce a higher equilibrium tax rate. Exceptions to 
this result would arise if either the new relevant median voter’s income was still equal to or 
above average income or if the decisive voter was already at subsistence levels in the first place.  
The former hypothesis can be dismissed by the overall evidence that income 
distributions are skewed to the right, which means that the median income lies below mean 
income. The latter would imply that a large majority of the population subsists on the fruits of 
labor of a small group of individuals, such that the decisive voter of the economic elite 
autocratic leaders respond to would not work. That possibility can also be reasonably dismissed. 
In summary, the presented model illustrates a mechanism whereby expansions of the 
suffrage would induce increases in redistribution through lump sum transfers. Such a scheme 
of redistribution is particularly akin to some features of social security systems operating in 
many countries, but there are many alternative ways by which collected funds can be 
redistributed. Furthermore, the presented framework only considers taxes on labor income. 
These results are not restrictive, however. It can in fact be shown that, under a set of additional 
assumptions, this relationship generalizes to other forms of redistribution. In my empirical 
analysis, whose underlying strategy is described in the next section, I test whether the proposed 




I introduce a partial adjustment model, similar to others in the relevant literature (see 
Aidt, Dutta and Loukoianova, 2006; Aidt and Jensen, 2013), aimed at testing the hypothesis 
that democratization processes induce increases in public consumption. Such a specification 
guarantees an identification of both the short and the long run effects, by including a lag of the 
outcome variable on the right-hand side. Aidt and Jensen (2013) justify their choice by referring 
to the high degree of persistence in the evolution of the size of government, the likely reason 
being “that fiscal commitments and institutions carry over from one year to the next”. The 
inclusion of first-order lags attempts to control for this phenomenon and allow for the estimated 
impact of democracy to be spread out over time. To this end, consider the model: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝜌𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝐷𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑋
′
𝑖𝑡−1𝛾 + 𝜑𝑖 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (9) 
, where the subscripts 𝑖 and 𝑡 index, respectively, each country and year. The dependent variable 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 accounts for government final consumption as a share of GDP, whereas the 𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 right-hand 
side variable denotes its one-year lag. The variable of interest, given by 𝐷𝑖𝑡−1, will be the one-
year lagged level of democracy. The same econometric procedure will be applied using both a 
binary and a continuous measure of democracy, described in more detail in the next chapter.  
Furthermore, a vector of control variables, represented by 𝑋′𝑖𝑡−1, encompasses other 
potential determinants of government consumption outlined in the relevant literature. Economic 
development, as measured by GDP per capita, is included following Wagner’s Law (Wagner, 
1883), which predicts that as countries become increasingly richer and more industrialized, the 
demand for public goods rises more than proportionately to income, implying them to be luxury 
goods. Urbanization is pointed out as one of the facets of such processes and could also drive 
the demand for the public provision of goods and services. Demographic trends, and 
particularly population growth, are likely to impact on government size as well. Lindert (1994) 
finds a positive relationship between an aging population and social spending. The share of 
young citizens could also influence public consumption, especially the expenditure on 
education. Three variables are included on the right-hand side, in order to capture these potential 
effects. In addition, Rodrik (1998) finds a positive relationship between trade openness and 
government size, as public spending would play “a risk-reducing role in economies exposed to 
a significant amount of external risk”. Hence, a measure of trade openness is included too.  
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There are two reasons for all controls to be lagged one year, as pointed out by Brown 
and Hunter (1999). First, policy outcomes are usually based on past economic and social 
developments. Second, it ensures a clearer direction of causality. Indeed, the potential existence 
of a reverse mechanism, whereby government consumption would influence democracy as well 
as some of my other controls, could lead to biased and inconsistent estimates. Thus, using 
lagged values for the independent variables ascertains a higher degree of confidence in my 
results. Finally, 𝜑𝑖 and 𝜇𝑡 account for, respectively, country and year dummies, while 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
denotes the error term, which captures all other omitted factors. 
One of the problems with the partial adjustment model in this case is the necessity of 
imposing assumptions on the number of years it should take for the first impact of 
democratizations to be felt. I initially consider one-year lags for all regressors, but Acemoglu 
et al. (2013), for instance, take 5-year lags and consider one observation per country every 5 
years, as they assume the effects of democratic institutions “not to appear instantaneously or 
not even in one or two years”. However, such a strategy has the drawback of substantially 
reducing the number of observations. An alternative would be to take averages, but, as 
Acemoglu et al. (2013) rightfully point out, that approach would “introduce a complex pattern 
of serial correlation, making consistent estimation more difficult”. Indeed, the time span over 
which the causal mechanism I estimate should arise is not clear. For that reason, I also replicate 
the same strategy taking 5-years lags instead and check whether the assumptions imposed on 
the number of years significantly alter my results. The sample is, for these cases, split into 12 
periods, starting in 1962 and ending in 2017. 
Another concern could arise from the existence of communist dictatorships, especially 
in the former Eastern Europe bloc. In those regimes, high levels of government consumption 
would probably not be due to the electoral base underlying policy choices but to the economic 
system itself. As a result, the mechanism I estimate could be severely confounded. Nonetheless, 
this should not be a major problem, as no data on government consumption is available for 
these countries prior to their democratization. This means my regressions do not take into 
account these countries’ within variations of democracy.    
A few other caveats underlie this empirical strategy and therefore some considerations 
should be made. Meltzer and Richards (1981) propose a mechanism under which the expansion 
of the voting franchise towards poorer segments of the population would necessarily imply that 
the new relevant median voter would be relatively less well-off. Under a set of assumptions 
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described in chapter 2, this would translate into a political equilibrium associated with a higher 
imposed tax rate. Simply put, there would be a ceteris paribus relationship between expansions 
of political power and levels of redistribution. Under the hypothesis I test, this mechanism 
would take the shape of a positive causal effect of the democracy variable on government final 
consumption, hence implying a positive estimated 𝛽. However, democratizations might impact 
on the public provision of goods and services through channels other than that proposed in my 
benchmark model. In fact, an extensive and not unambiguous literature focuses on the 
relationship between democracy and economic development, with diverging results. Acemoglu 
et al. (2019), for instance, estimate a positive and significant effect of democratization on 
economic growth, while Barro (1996) finds a weakly negative relationship. Since I control for 
the log of GDP per capita and other variables potentially correlated with democracy, it could 
be argued that this strategy suffers from a “bad control” problem. Nevertheless, the aim of my 
empirical analysis is to estimate the direct causal effect of democratization on government 
consumption as predicted by Meltzer and Richard. My results will, thus, not necessarily imply 
that a more complex combination of causal mechanisms, with different public consumption 
outcomes, does not exist. 
Furthermore, omitted variables which we do not observe might also influence my 
dependent variables and be correlated with democracy. There are likely to be considerable 
institutional and cultural differences between democracies and autocracies, potentially biasing 
my results. The inclusion of country dummies, i.e. the use of country fixed effects aims at 
controlling for all time invariant determinants of government size by exploiting within country 
variations. Likewise, global shocks in specific time periods might have had a generalized 
impact on government consumption and, therefore, I also control for time fixed effects. 
Throughout the implementation of this strategy the sequential exogeneity condition is 
assumed to hold, such that 
𝐸[𝜀𝑖𝑡|𝑌𝑖𝑡−1, 𝐷𝑖𝑡−1, 𝑋
′
𝑖𝑡−1, 𝜑𝑖 , 𝜇𝑡] = 0. (10) 
However, applying fixed effects when taking lagged dependent variables generates a 
bias (see Nickel, 1981) and renders my estimator inconsistent. Indeed, for finite 𝑇 samples, the 
dynamic fixed effects estimator does not satisfy the sequential exogeneity assumption, because 
the time-demeaning operation will imply that the lagged dependent variable regressor in the 
transformed model encodes information from the dependent variable. The latter is, in turn, 






 (Nickel, 1981). Even though Judson and Owen (1999) show that the bias 
is negligible for panels with 𝑇 larger than 20, which is the case for half of my empirical analysis, 
I still implement one of the potential solutions for this issue. Following Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) 
and Arellano and Bond (1991), I introduce a standard GMM estimator for dynamic panel 
models. In this context, two possibilities for removing fixed effects arise: first differencing or 
forward orthogonal deviations. I prefer the latter, because it preserves the sample size in panels 












, where, for all variables, the mean of future observations for each country is subtracted from 
each observation. Also, 𝑇𝑖𝑡 denotes the number of times 𝑤𝑖𝑠  appears in the sample for 𝑠 > 𝑡. 
This strategy, first proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995), naturally removes all time invariant 
factors, as intended. Yet, an endogeneity issue remains, as the lagged dependent variable is still 
correlated with the error term, given that both encode information from future observations. In 
this case, however, the problem can be solved by using lagged values of the dependent variable 
in levels as instruments (Arellano and Bond, 1991). Indeed, second and further lags could be 
used as instruments for the lagged dependent variable, but, since the number of instruments is 
quadratic in 𝑇, such a strategy would probably induce a “too many instruments” bias (Newey 
and Windmeijer, 2009). For that reason, I collapse the instruments set and take a GMM 
estimator of my dynamic panel model.  
So far, few considerations have been made regarding the hypothesis that democracy 
might be endogenous, under which the above condition would not be satisfied and my estimator 
would be inconsistent, even after controlling for the bias that results from the fixed effects 
operation in a dynamic panel model. Taking lags of democracy rather than contemporaneous 
information partially tackles this issue. However, it is not a sufficiently credible solution, given 
the persistence of government consumption and, therefore, the likeliness that even lagged levels 
of democracy might be correlated with the error term. Indeed, endogeneity could arise for 
several reasons. There could be a reverse mechanism, by which government consumption 
would influence the probability a country becomes democratic. Levels of democracy could also 
be correlated with time-varying omitted factors that the fixed effects transformation does not 
control for. In addition, measurement errors in the measures of democracy could trigger 
endogeneity concerns as well. Therefore, I also implement an instrumental variables strategy, 
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by taking a widely used instrument from the relevant literature. To this end, I exploit the fact 
that democratizations tend to occur in regional waves (Huntington, 1991) and my instrumental 








, where 𝑟 denotes each of the seven considered regions, 𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡  is a dummy variable indicating 
whether a country was democratic (𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡 = 1) or nondemocratic (𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡 = 0) at the beginning 
of my sample and 𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡 is the number of countries in that region sharing the same initial regime 
type with country 𝑖. This construction conditions on regional democratic capital among 
countries sharing the same initial regime type because a rising demand for democracy is 
expected to spread to other nondemocracies in the region and, conversely, a rising demand for 
autocracy is assumed to spread to other democracies.  
This measure is, as predicted, positively correlated with national levels of democracy 
but the instrument’s validity is still dependent on the extent to which regional democracy is not 
correlated with each country’s public consumption via other factors. In other words, regional 
democracy should affect government consumption only through its effect on each country’s 
level of democracy, such that the instrument’s exogeneity condition is satisfied. Two lags, 
rather than just one lag, of this variable are used, so that tests for overidentifying restrictions 
can be performed. The necessary condition becomes 
𝐸[𝜀𝑖𝑡|𝑌𝑖𝑡−1, 𝑍𝑖𝑡−1, 𝑍𝑖𝑡−2𝑋
′
𝑖𝑡−1, 𝜑𝑖, 𝜇𝑡] = 0 (13) 
Finally, throughout the implementation of my empirical strategy, I relax the assumption 
of no serial correlation of the error term within each country by taking standard errors clustered 
at the country level.  
Data 
I construct a panel comprising 191 countries for the 1960-2017 period. However, this 
panel dataset is unbalanced, as there are missing observations for some variables. To capture 
the level of democracy, I use two different measures: the continuous 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦2 indicator, 
retrieved from the POLITY IV dataset, and a binary variable developed by Acemoglu et al. 
(2019), in an extension of Papaioannou and Siorounis’ (2008) indicator. The former, ranging 
from -10 (full autocracy) to 10 (full democracy) takes a set of political institutions into account 
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in the definition of each nation’s level of democracy: the presence of mechanisms through 
which citizens can express preferences about alternative policies and leaders; the openness of 
executive recruitment; the existence of institutionalized executive constraints on the exercise 
of power and the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of 
political participation. It is therefore an account of the features most commonly attributed to 
well-functioning democracies.  
The binary variable, henceforth denoted 𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐, scores 1 for democracies and 0 for 
autocracies, by combining the 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦2 score with the Freedom House’s trichotomous indicator, 
to reduce measurement error. Freedom House codes countries as “Free”, “Partially Free” or 
“Not free” and my binary measure assigns a democratic coding to each country when they are 
considered “Free” or “Partially Free” and their 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦2 score is positive. In addition, two 
different binary measures, from Cheibub, Ghandi and Vreeland (2010) and Boix, Miller and 
Rosato (2012), are also employed in this variable’s construction whenever the 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦2 or the 
Freedom House scores are missing. These supplementary indicators are particularly important 
for the period prior to 1972, for which there are no Freedom House observations. A full 
description of the used algorithm can be consulted in the Appendix.  
The motivation behind the implementation of Acemoglu et al.’s (2019) extended 
measure lies on their consideration of reversals from democracy. Indeed, Papaioannou and 
Siorounis (2008) only code permanent transitions to democracy. This approach has the 
drawback of potentially triggering endogeneity issues in the sense that the return of a recently 
democratized nation back to autocracy might be related to other outcomes present in my 
empirical analysis. In particular, the stability of a democracy in that context might be dependent 
on pursued public policies. Thus, only accounting for permanent transitions would probably 
exacerbate issues of reverse causality and aggravate the risk of biased estimation. 
In brief, the binary 𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐 indicator of democracy is present for 191 countries and the 
continuous 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦2 measure is available for 164. There are 9406 country/year observations in 
the sample for the former measure, whereas the latter is observed 8273 times. The binary 
construct, specifically, codes countries as democratic for 4889 observations and nondemocratic 
for 4517, with 121 observed transitions to and 74 reversals from democracy. All these transition 
processes are recorded in Tables 2 and 3. Additional descriptive statistics for the binary variable 
of democracy are also shown, including over time variation of average democracy in the world 
or by region (Figures 1 and 2).  
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All other variables included in my analysis were retrieved from the World Development 
Indicators dataset, which collects its figures from a wide list of sources. All those original 
sources are reported, for each variable, in the Appendix (Table A1).  
Government final consumption, which will be the outcome variable in my regression 
analyses, includes all government current expenditures for purchases of goods and services 
(including compensation of employees). It also includes most expenditures on national defence 
and security but excludes military expenditures that are part of capital formation. 
Control variables include GDP per capita at constant 2010 US$, total population, share 
of the population aged 14 or less, share of the population aged 65 or above, share of the 
population living in urban areas and a measure of trade openness, given by the sum of exports 
and imports (% GDP). Urban areas in the corresponding variable are defined by national 
statistics offices, but the collection process conducted by the United Nations Population 
Division, which is the original source, guarantees comparability of results.  
Descriptive statistics for all considered variables are shown in Table 1, separated for 
democracies and nondemocracies, so that patterns can be examined. In addition, I also plot the 
relationship between government consumption and levels of democracy for both the binary and 
the continuous measures, in Figures 3 and 4. Interestingly, though a clear pattern is not found 
for the binary indicator, a U shaped relationship arises once the continuous measure is plotted 
against government consumption. It must be noted that the highest average levels of 
government consumption are reported for the two extreme scenarios of political freedom. In 
particular, and counterintuitively considering my benchmark model, extreme dictatorships 
record the highest level. This could imply that political stability might be an important 
determinant of government consumption.  
Results 
Baseline results are reported in Table 4 and Table 5, which contain the estimates of my 
partial adjustment model for, respectively, the 1-year and 5-years lags specifications. In the first 
two columns of each table, the model is estimated by imposing the coefficient on the lagged 
dependent variable to be equal to zero (𝜌 = 0). Even though this represents a departure from 
the assumed existence of dynamics in the evolution of public consumption, it is still a good 
starting point to assess the effect of democracy. These first estimates seem to validate the 
hypothesis that transitions to democracy induce increases in the share of government 
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consumption on GDP. Indeed, the coefficients associated with both the binary 𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐 and the 
continuous 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦2 variables are positive and significant at the 1% level, regardless of whether 
1-year or 5-years lags are considered. Once the persistence of the dependent variable is 
controlled for by relaxing the assumption that 𝜌 = 0, as in columns 3 and 4 of each table, 
democracy retains its significance, though only at the 5% level. Also, the estimate of 𝜌 is always 
significantly different from zero, confirming the assumption of a strong persistence on 
government consumption. This specification allows for the effect of the independent variables 
on the outcome variable to be spread out over time and, in addition, guarantees the 
quantification of the long-run effect by setting 𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝑌𝑖𝑡−1, i.e. by imposing that the outcome 




Under the 1-year lags specification, democracy is estimated to generate a 11.11% increase in 
the share of government consumption on GDP over the long-run. Although the dependent 
variable is always denoted as a percentage, this effect is still given in relative terms rather than 
percentage points, since logs were taken. The long-term impact of democracy is estimated to 
be slightly lower, of 9.32%, in the alternative 5-years lags specification. Long-run effects for 
the continuous variable of democracy are calculated by assuming drastic changes to democracy, 
from -10 to 10. Hence, estimated coefficients for the 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦2 variable are multiplied by 20 
before entering the long-run expression presented above. Switches from 0 to 1 in the 𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐 
measure do not necessarily describe democratic transitions as radical as those associated with 
a move from one extreme to the other in the 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦2 indicator. As a result, the potential long-
run positive impact on public consumption should not be as strong either. My reports confirm 
this intuition, as all estimated long-run effects for the continuous variable are higher than those 
for the binary one in the corresponding specification. In the 1-year lag model, this impact is 
estimated to be of 18.66%, whereas in the 5-years lags one, the estimate amounts to 13.11%. 
These first estimates provide some evidence for the hypothesis I test. However, dynamic 
panel models tend to be biased when fixed effects are used, as discussed before. Indeed, for 
panels with finite 𝑇, the time demeaning transformation generates a mechanical negative bias 
on the estimate of the coefficient associated with the lagged dependent variable. This bias is 
larger for lower 𝑇. Hence, it becomes a major concern in the 5 years lags model, where only 12 
periods are considered, but it may also be non-negligible in the other specification. For that 
reason, columns 5 and 6 of each table report results of a GMM estimator where the variables 
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are transformed by taking forward orthogonal deviations. Second and further lags of the 
dependent variable in levels are used as instruments for the endogenous variable, which is the 
transformed first lag on the right-hand side. As mentioned earlier, this estimator is biased and 
consistent, as long as the used instruments are valid, that is, as long as the instruments are 
guaranteed not to be correlated with the transformed error term. Since second and further lags 
in levels could be taken as instruments, the satisfaction of that condition requires no second 
order serial correlation of the error term in differences. That seems to be the case for the 5-years 
lags model but not for the 1-year lag one. Yet, the 𝐴𝑅(3) test in Table 4 suggests that there is 
no third order serial correlation in the differenced residuals in the latter and therefore third and 
further lags are used in that model. Besides, the Hansen p-value of the test for overidentifying 
restrictions passes comfortably for all cases, ensuring a higher confidence on the exogeneity of 
my instruments.  
The estimates for the coefficients of the lagged dependent variable that result from this 
GMM estimator are, as anticipated given the negative bias, higher than those from the standard 
OLS estimator using country and year fixed effects. It should also be noted that the difference 
between estimates is considerably larger in the 5-years lags model, where the number of time 
periods was lower and therefore the expected bias was more pronounced. The estimated 
coefficients for democracy, on the other hand, are smaller and less significant. Even though 
these estimates retain significance, albeit at the 10% level, the results suggest that earlier 
evidence for the hypothesized positive effect of democracy on government consumption could 
be, to some extent, driven by the failure to model the dynamics of the latter and by the Nickel 
bias arising from the inclusion of a lag. 
Moreover, among the set of control variables, only per capita GDP and the share of the 
population aged 65+ tend to show a positive and significant effect, as predicted, though not 
consistently across specifications. The latter, particularly, seems not to be significant in the 5-
years lags specification once dynamics and the Nickel bias are controlled for.  
The fit of the model is not very strong either. Total adjusted 𝑅2𝑠 tend to be considerable 
in the dynamic specifications, standing at around 90% and 55% in the 1-year and 5-years lags 
models, respectively. However, these values are artificially boosted by the inclusion of the 
lagged dependent variable. Once the lag is removed, the set of regressors tends to explain 
roughly 20% of the variation in government final consumption. 
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The fact that the outcome variable is to great extent explained by variables not included 
in my regressions raises the concern that, if lagged democracy is correlated with some of those 
variables, my estimators will be biased and inconsistent. Indeed, although time-invariant 
determinants of government consumption are ruled out once fixed effects are controlled for, 
other time-varying factors captured by the error term might be correlated with my variable of 
interest. Furthermore, as noted earlier, there may also be a reverse mechanism of causality 
whereby public consumption impacts on the stability of a democratic regime or on the 
probability that democratization processes take place. Under this scenario, my democracy 
variable would also be correlated with the error term, undermining the consistency of my 
estimators. Results reported in Table 6 and Table 7 are derived by implementing my 
instrumental variables strategy aimed at tackling this issue.  
This strategy is carried out without the implementation of a GMM estimator correcting for the 
Nickel bias. As stressed out before, an inclusion of lags of the dependent variable when 
controlling for fixed effects induces a mechanical bias on the estimates. However, if in addition 
to the lagged levels of the dependent variable necessary to render the GMM estimator unbiased 
and consistent, new instruments for my variable of interest were also considered, the resulting 
estimates would be too sensitive to specification choices. Conclusions based on such an 
estimator would hardly be reliable. Therefore, I implement my two-stage least squares strategy, 
taking both the one and the two periods lags of the level of regional democracy as instruments, 
and compare the results with those earlier derived from the standard OLS within-estimator. This 
procedure allows for testing whether the initially estimated positive effect of democracy on 
government consumption was mainly due to the existence of endogeneity on the former.  
In Tables 6 and 7, it is possible to check that all estimated coefficients on democracy 
but those for the 1-year lags model with no lagged dependent variable are higher than the 
coefficients estimated without an instrument. Significance levels are generally retained, with a 
just mentioned exception. Also, the estimated long-run effects of a switch to democracy are 
substantially higher, at around 30% and 48% for, respectively, the 𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐 and 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦2 
variables. Even though not entirely robust, these results suggest that there was a downward bias 
on the OLS estimation of the impact of a transition to democracy on public consumption, which 
means that democracy might have been negatively correlated with the error term. A plausible 
explanation for this relationship could be the aforementioned issue of reverse causality. Indeed, 
if lower levels of government consumption generate popular discontent towards an autocratic 
regime, the probability of a coup and therefore of a transition to democracy could increase. 
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Given the potential existence of within-country serial correlation, those past low levels of the 
error term might persist even after the democratization process, such that the sequential 
exogeneity assumption does not hold. It could be argued that a similar pattern of low 
government consumption might generate discontent towards democratic regimes, increasing 
the chances of a change to nondemocracy. If that was the case, the final effect on the correlation 
between democracy and the error term could be null. Yet, my sample has more switches to 
democracy than the converse. In the OLS regression with a lagged dependent variable, there 
are, for instance, 95 observed democratizations and 59 observed reversals to nondemocracy. 
Thus, this bias is likely to be more pronounced for the former cases10.  
These results must still be interpreted with caution as they rely on the assumption that 
regional democratic trends are not correlated with national levels of public consumption. 
Democracy waves could, however, be related to region-wide trends in the public provision of 
goods and services. At any rate, my 2SLS results suggest that should not be the case. All tests 
for overidentifying restrictions fail to reject the null hypothesis by a large margin. There also 
seems not to be an issue of weak instruments, which could jeopardize my instrumental variables 
strategy, as all F statistics for the excluded instruments on the first stage regressions pass the 
commonly used threshold of 10. 
Throughout my empirical analysis, heteroskedasticity and serial correlation should not 
be a problem either. As mentioned before, the assumption that the errors are 𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑. is relaxed to 
allow for serial correlation at the country level, by using clustered standard errors. Correlations 
among observations for the same time period could be confidently ruled out as well, because 
year fixed effects were applied in all my regressions and any time specific factors weighing on 
government consumption should be captured by the year dummies. Finally, the number of 
observations and considered countries are reported in all cases. The number of observed 
changes, either from autocracy to democracy or conversely, is also reported for all regressions 
where the 𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐 measure is used.  
Though not robust, these results depart from those of Mulligan et al. (2004) and provide 
some evidence for the positive relationship between democracy and government consumption, 
as posited by Meltzer and Richard. This discrepancy can best be explained by the different used 
                                                             
10 Given the time demeaning operation, all countries which remain democratic or nondemocratic throughout the 
whole sample period will be assigned a value of zero for all observations of their democracy variable. Thus, for 
those countries, there will not be a distinction between democracies and nondemocracies in their correlations 
with the error term. 
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specifications. By controlling for country and year fixed effects, I rule out potential 
determinants of government consumption which could be confounding the tested mechanism. 
Besides, I take the dynamics of government consumption into account, while Mulligan et al. 
(2004) do not. In the Appendix (Table A2) I report a replication of my estimations taking 
sample averages for each variable and running cross-sectional OLS regressions. My results 
become highly ambiguous. In addition, I also run regressions similar to those from Tables 4 
and 5, but using a pooled OLS specification instead. In these cases,  whose results are reported 
in Tables A3 and A4, democracy is estimated to have a negative and significant effect on 
government consumption.   
However, the positive impact of democracy on public consumption that I estimate is not 
as robust as, for instance, the results derived by Acemoglu et al. (2013) in their estimation of 
the effect of democracy on measures of taxation revenue or total government revenue. Indeed, 
not all my estimated coefficients are significant at the 1% level. Also, results become less 
significant once the Nickel bias is controlled for using a GMM estimator. In chapter 3, I outlined 
the main features underlying Meltzer and Richard’s argument. In the next section, I point out 
some of the reasons why this model might not display a perfect description of the actual 
relationship between democratization processes and government consumption.  
Theoretical Considerations 
The results generated by the benchmark model of Meltzer and Richard are dependent 
on a set of assumptions on the political process, the scheme of redistribution and individual 
preferences. Thus, if some of these assumptions fail do hold, democratization processes might 
not lead to increases in the size of government. My estimates of the effect of democracy on 
redistribution through government consumption are not entirely robust, which could be 
explained precisely by the failure of some of those conditions to be met. Throughout this section 
I draw on the relevant literature to expose some of the reasons why that could be the case. 
The starting point in the theoretical argument lies on the conceptualization of democracy 
as opposed to nondemocracy. Indeed, one of the basic premises of the model is that autocratic 
leaders only respond to a small minority which stands at the extreme right of the income 
distribution, i.e. to a wealthy elite. Democratic leaders, on the other hand, would have to 
respond to the whole population. While this depiction seems to conform to the general aspects 
associated with voting rules under both regime types, it also fails to set the distinction between 
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de jure and de facto political power. In the benchmark model, the political processes under both 
voting rules are such that in democracies political power is more widespread. This sort of 
power, derived from existing political institutions, is defined as de jure political power. 
However, in a more primitive sense, political power comes from “what a group can do to other 
groups and the society at large by using force” (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006). This is 
commonly referred to as de facto political power. In the considered framework, it is not as clear 
which groups de facto political power truly belongs to under each voting rule. Although the 
wealthy minority, which is against redistribution, is assumed to hold political power under 
nondemocracies, dictators may still answer the political demands of the poor majority out of 
fear of a coup. If the majority has the power to expropriate resources or even set the path for a 
revolution and therefore replace the existing regime and its leader, it may indeed hold political 
power.11 In this scenario, there might not be actual voting rule differences between both types 
of regimes and politically determined levels of redistribution could be similar under both 
democracy and nondemocracy.  
Conversely, the assumption that the voting rule in a democratic context allows for a 
more widespread distribution of political power is based on the existence of elections, which 
indirectly determine policy decisions, whereby all individuals in the income distribution are 
only assigned one vote. Simply put, everyone holds the same de jure political power. Yet, de 
facto political power in these circumstances might not be as equally distributed as the model 
presumes. In fact, democracy may be “captured” or “constrained” by an organized minority 
which, according to Acemoglu and Robinson (2008), has an incentive to invest in order to retain 
its de facto power when relative de jure power is lost. This stronger incentive accruing to the 
elite arises from its small number of members and higher expected returns from controlling 
policy making. In other words, following this underlying argument, the distribution of de facto 
political power is an equilibrium outcome. Under these circumstances, there are many ways 
through which the elite could keep holding a disproportionate share of de facto political power. 
Lobbying and bribery are examples of means by which the party system can be controlled by 
the elite. Capital flight or tax evasion are other forms of de facto power. The aforementioned 
threat of a coup could also exist in this case, as long as the elite is able to determine military 
interventions. Hence, though democratizations may enfranchise poorer segments of the 
population, stronger incentives for the investment in de facto political power may imply that 
                                                             
11 See Grossman (1994, 1995) and Falkinger (1999). 
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policy decisions will remain subject to the preferences of the elite. As a result, democratizations 
constrained by such phenomena may not necessarily induce increases of redistribution. 
Another potential divergence between the model and the actual political process under 
democracies lies on the existence of voting costs, which are not accounted for in Meltzer and 
Richard’s framework. If, as assumed, agents do not incur in any costs by exercising their right 
to vote, all eligible voters will participate in elections and thus the median voter is also the agent 
with the median income. However, voter turnout rates are never equal to 100%. For that reason, 
it is plausible that voting is costly or that some agents are indifferent to election outcomes. In 
addition, empirical studies in political participation have shown that the probability an agent 
votes is positively correlated with his income (see Verba et al. 1995). This implies that the 
median voter may be wealthier than the agent with the median income, leading to levels of 
redistribution lower than those arising in a context where there are no voting costs. 
The arguments presented so far have dealt with the assumptions regarding the 
distribution of political power and the incentives to exercise it. Yet, even in the absence of a 
departure from these conditions, other aspects of the political process in the model may not be 
consistent with reality. One of the most important assumptions is that the policy decision under 
vote is unidimensional: each agent only chooses the tax rate which will be imposed on labor 
income in order to finance a lump sum transfer. This is clearly a large stretch from the complex 
and multidimensional set of policies that are politically determined in a democracy. In fact, 
each vote should capture preferences regarding multiple policy choices (eg spending on 
education, spending on healthcare, existence of a minimum wage, legal abortion, legal same-
sex marriage). Once a set of choices of this kind is considered, the median voter model becomes 
no longer applicable. Thus, the higher the relative importance of political decisions related to 
policy choices other than the level of redistribution, the less likely are democratizations to 
generate increases in government consumption. 
Also, the configuration of the redistribution scheme can have implications for the 
benchmark model’s results. In the considered framework, a lump sum transfer is equally 
distributed throughout the population. However, redistribution can be targeted such that not all 
agents receive the same amount. This issue is particularly relevant for redistribution through 
the provision of goods and services, which is at the core of my empirical analysis. Certain types 
of public spending might be regressive in the sense that richer segments of the population tend 
to be disproportionately benefitted (eg expenditure on the provision of cultural activities or 
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higher education). Given the potential regressive nature of these “Sheriff of Nottingham” types 
of redistribution, poor agents might prefer lower levels of government consumption. If, on the 
other hand, democracy is “captured” by the elite, the effect of the regime transition on overall 
government consumption could become less clear. 
Finally, the assumptions on individual preferences may also significantly diverge from 
how voters make political decisions. In particular, the model ignores the role of ideology in the 
preferences for certain policies. Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2001), for instance, show that 
racial heterogeneity and animosity play a key role in explaining the differences in the size of 
the welfare state in the US when compared to European countries.  
Expectations about future income, which are also ignored by the static benchmark 
model, may determine individual preferences as well, in very different ways. Alesina and 
Ferrara (2005) provide evidence that expectations of upward mobility are associated with less 
support for redistribution. In addition, social mobility is closely connected to the just mentioned 
role of ideology, as it tends to intensify the belief that poorness is the result of laziness. Hence, 
preferences for redistribution should be lower in societies where income is highly perceived to 
result from individual merit. Nevertheless, income uncertainty might also impact on preferences 
in the opposite way. If the perceived risk of future income shocks and risk aversion are high, 
agents may want to rely on redistribution as an insurance mechanism, an idea which can be 
interpreted as a variation of Rawls’ (1971) argument. In brief, policy preferences are certainly 
guided by expectations about future outcomes, but the relationship between those expectations 
and desired levels of redistribution is not theoretically clear. At any rate, the failure of the 
benchmark model to take forward looking behaviour into account is another reason why it may 
not perfectly describe the political process. 
Some of the limitations of Meltzer and Richard’s (1981) model to depict the effect of 
democracy on redistribution, in general, and government consumption, in particular, have been 
put forth throughout this section, but other issues have been left out. A more comprehensive 
examination of the caveats underlying the equilibrium choices for redistribution can be 
consulted, for instance, in Putterman (1996). Dynamic models of policy choices have not been 
considered either. In that regard, Krusell, Ríos-Rull and Quadrini (1997), Krusell and Ríos-Rull 
(1999), Hassler et al. (2003), Battaglini and Coate (2008) are examples of a growing literature 
on the topic.  
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Despite the limitations referred throughout, this model is still one of the building blocks 
of the political economy of taxation and a valuable tool in understanding the policy making 
process. Moreover, though not perfectly, the data for the evolution of public consumption over 
the past half century provide some evidence for the model’s proposition that, once a democracy 
replaces an autocracy, poorer segments of the population gain political voice and higher levels 
of redistribution are attained. My empirical results seem to suggest that the expected increase 
in redistribution is sufficiently generalized to also include government consumption rather than 
being limited to cash transfer schemes. That can be considered as a proof of the model’s 
relevance and broad base of applications. 
Conclusion 
Many empirical studies of the policy implications of democratization have failed to 
reach definitive conclusions. I find some evidence of a positive effect of democracy on 
government consumption, but once some sources of bias are controlled for, conclusions can no 
longer be derived with a high level of confidence. In a broad sense, this can be interpreted as 
an additional proof of the complex web of mechanisms through which political and economic 
institutions influence each other. Given the multitude of political, economic, social and perhaps 
even cultural effects arising from transitions to democracy, fitting the data to theoretical models 
will probably remain an arduous endeavour. Nevertheless, there are two main reasons why 
researchers should keep trying to expand our knowledge frontier on this topic.  
First, the implications of changes to and from democracy will no doubt shape our future 
historical evolution. The emergence of China as a leading world economy may, for instance, be 
dependent on how its regime copes with the potential need to allow for stronger political 
freedom. Also, rising concerns that countries such as Hungary or Poland may be receding back 
to dictatorship could imply radical policy changes if said transitions materialize. Hence, this 
will certainly remain a relevant topic.     
Second, the large amount of existing studies does not mean new research opportunities 
do not exist. My empirical strategy relied on the control of country level heterogeneity using 
fixed effects, which removed time-invariant variables. New analyses may instead focus 
precisely on the association between democracy and persistent factors, such as religion and 
cultural norms. Perhaps the extent to which the electorate may prefer higher levels of 
redistribution might be dependent on religious affiliation, which influences individual beliefs. 
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Besides, reported levels of government consumption were highest for the two extreme scenarios 
of political freedom using the 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦2 score (Figure 3). Assessing the relationship between 
political stability rather than types of regime and measures of redistribution may also yield new 
meaningful insights. Lastly, democratic systems are highly heterogenous. Further research may 
also check how different forms of democratic representation tend to induce different fiscal 
policy outcomes.     
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 Non-Democracies  Democracies 
Variable N Mean Std.Dev.   N Mean Std.Dev. 
Government Consumption (% of 
GDP), log 
3289 2.6072 0.0082 
 
4051 2.7306 0.0059 
GDP per capita, log 3519 7.5012 0.0216  4587 8.7333 0.0207 
Population, log 4430 15.5994 0.026  4851 15.2903 0.0327 
Share of population aged 65+ 4433 4.0173 0.0326  4599 8.5057 0.0741 
Share of population aged 14- 4399 40.0095 0.1211  4599 29.894 0.1517 
Urbanization Rate 4433 40.6871 0.3558  4841 57.5158 0.3223 
Trade (% GDP) 3549 73.3978 0.919  4384 77.9059 0.6472 
Note: Summary statistics broken by observations for non-democracies (left panel) and democracies (right 
panel), according to the 𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐 variable. For each variable, the number of observations, its mean and standard 














Table 2: Democratizations in the sample 
Country Year  Country Year  Country Year 
Albania 1991  Guatemala 1986  Pakistan 1988 
Albania 1997  Guinea 2010  Pakistan 2008 
Argentina 1973  Guinea-Bissau 1994  Panama 1990 
Argentina 1983  Guinea-Bissau 1999  Paraguay 1989 
Armenia 1998  Guinea-Bissau 2005  Peru 1963 
Azerbeijan 1992  Guyana 1992  Peru 1979 
Bangladesh 1991  Haiti 1990  Peru 1993 
Bangladesh 2009  Haiti 1994  Philippines 1986 
Benin 1991  Haiti 2006  Poland 1989 
Bhutan 2008  Haiti 2016  Portugal 1975 
Bolivia 1982  Honduras 1980  Romania 1991 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1996  Hungary 1989  Russia 1992 
Brazil 1985  Indonesia 1999  Sao Tome and Principe 1991 
Bulgaria 1990  Ivory Coast 2000  Senegal 2000 
Burkina Faso 1977  Ivory Coast 2012  Serbia 2000 
Burkina Faso 2015  Kenya 2002  Sierra Leone 1996 
Burundi 2003  Kyrgyzstan 2005  Sierra Leone 2001 
Cambodia 1993  Lebanon 2005  South Africa 1994 
Cape Verde 1991  Lesotho 1993  South Korea 1987 
Central African Republic 1993  Lesotho 1999  Spain 1976 
Chile 1989  Liberia 2004  Sudan 1965 
Comoros 1990  Madagascar 1991  Sudan 1986 
Comoros 1996  Madagascar 2011  Suriname 1990 
Comoros 2002  Malawi 1994  Taiwan 1992 
Congo Brazzaville 1992  Maldives 2008  Tanzania 2015 
Croatia 1999  Mali 1992  Thailand 1974 
Cyprus 1974  Mali 2013  Thailand 1978 
Djibouti 1999  Mauritania 2007  Thailand 1992 
Dominican Republic 1978  Mexico 1994  Thailand 2008 
Ecuador 1979  Mongolia 1990  Tunisia 2011 
El Salvador 1982  Mozambique 1994  Turkey 1961 
Ethiopia 1995  Myanmar  2016  Turkey 1973 
Fiji 1990  Nepal 1990  Turkey 1983 
Fiji 2014  Nepal 2006  Uganda 1980 
Gambia 2017  Nicaragua 1990  Uruguay 1985 
Ghana 1970  Niger 1991  Venezuela 2013 
Ghana 1979  Niger 1999  Zambia 1991 
Ghana 1996  Niger 2010  Zimbabwe 1978 
Greece 1974  Nigeria 1979  Zimbabwe 2015 
Grenada 1984  Nigeria 1999    
Guatemala 1966   Pakistan 1972       
Note: This table reports all transitions from autocracy to democracy in my sample using the dichotomous 




Table 3: Reversals in the sample 
Country Year  Country Year 
Albania 1996  Madagascar 2009 
Argentina 1976  Mali 2012 
Armenia 1996  Mauritania 2008 
Azerbaijan 1993  Myanmar  1962 
Bangladesh 1974  Nepal 2002 
Bangladesh 2007  Niger 1996 
Belarus 1995  Niger 2009 
Brazil 1964  Nigeria 1966 
Burkina Faso 1980  Nigeria 1984 
Burundi 2014  Pakistan 1977 
Cambodia 1995  Pakistan 1999 
Central African Republic 2003  Panama 1968 
Chile 1973  Peru 1962 
Comoros 1976  Peru 1968 
Comoros 1995  Peru 1992 
Comoros 1999  Philippines 1965 
Congo Brazzaville 1963  Russia 2004 
Congo Brazzaville 1997  Sierra Leone 1967 
Djibouti 2010  Sierra Leone 1997 
Ecuador 1961  Somalia 1969 
Ethiopia 2005  South Korea 1961 
Fiji 1987  Sudan 1969 
Fiji 2006  Sudan 1989 
Gambia 1994  Suriname 1980 
Ghana 1972  Thailand 1976 
Ghana 1981  Thailand 1991 
Greece 1967  Thailand 2006 
Grenada 1979  Thailand 2014 
Guatemala 1974  Turkey 1971 
Guinea-Bissau 1998  Turkey 1980 
Guinea-Bissau 2003  Turkey 2016 
Haiti 1991  Uganda 1985 
Haiti 2000  Uruguay 1972 
Haiti 2010  Venezuela 2009 
Ivory Coast 2002  Venezuela 2016 
Lebanon 1975  Zimbabwe 1987 
Lesotho 1998  Zimbabwe 2017 
Note: This sample reports all transitions from democracy to autocracy in my sample 







Table 4: Effects of democracy on government consumption – 1 Year Lag 
  1 Year Lags Model 
 
FE      
𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐  









































































































       
𝐴𝑑𝑗. 𝑅2        
𝑊𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛 0.1133 0.1134 0.7660 0.7668   
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛 0.2637 0.2387 0.9705 0.9674   
𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙 0.2100 0.2007 0.8974 0.8934   
       
𝑂𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 6777 6414 6750 6389 6584 6234 
𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠 166 155 166 155 166 155 
𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑠 154  154  152  
𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔 − 𝑟𝑢𝑛 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡   11.11% 18.66% 11.35% 14.68% 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠     117 117 
𝐻𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑛 𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒     0.231 0.386 
𝐴𝑅(2) 𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒     0.032 0.021 
𝐴𝑅(3)𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒     0.186 0.207 
Note: Effect of democracy on government final consumption as a percentage of GDP. In all specifications I 
control for country and year fixed effects. Each time period in this table accounts for one year. Robust 
standards errors, clustered by country are reported in parentheses. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** 











Table 5: Effects of democracy on government consumption – 5 Years Lag 
  5 Years Lags Model 
 FE      
𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐  





























0.0393*        
(0.0220) 
0.0033*    
(0.0017) 






0.0685**    
(0.034) 








-0.0044    
(0.0774) 
-0.0105    
(0.0780) 
-0.0001   
(0.0713) 
-0.0050     
(0.0723) 




0.0154*    
(0.0088) 
0.0147    
(0.0089) 
0.0070    
(0.0082) 
0.0070       
(0.0084) 




0.0013     
(0.0035) 
0.001       
(0.0036) 
-0.0009     
(0.0028) 
-0.0010    
(0.0029) 




-0.0008   
(0.0018) 
-0.001     
(0.0019) 
-0.0016    
(0.0016) 
-0.0018    
(0.0017) 




-0.0002    
(0.0004) 
0.0000     
(0.0005) 
-0.0005    
(0.0004) 
-0.0003   
(0.0004) 
       
𝐴𝑑𝑗. 𝑅2        
𝑊𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛 0.085 0.0861 0.2440 0.2467   
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛 0.2144 0.2253 0.6791 0.6876   
𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙 0.1876 0.1948 0.5460 0.5487   
       
𝑂𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 1299 1228 1277 1208 1114 1056 
𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠 166 154 163 152 160 149 
𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑠 116  116  103  
𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔 − 𝑟𝑢𝑛 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡   9.32% 13.11% 9.73% 15.59% 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠     27 27 
𝐻𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑛 𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒     0.377 0.388 
𝐴𝑅(2) 𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒     0.225 0.242 
𝐴𝑅(3)𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒     0.220 0.224 
Note: Effect of democracy on government final consumption as a percentage of GDP. In all specifications I 
control for country and year fixed effects. Each time period in this table accounts for five year. Robust 
standards errors, clustered by country are reported in parentheses. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** 









Table 6: 2SLS - Effects of democracy on government consumption - 1 
Year Lag 








































































𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑠 
    
















     
𝐹 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑥𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 21.88 17.28 21.77 17.53 
𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 0.463 0.3128 0.8423 0.9467 
𝑂𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 6688 6333 6663 6310 
𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠 166 155 166 155 
𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑠 154    
𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔 − 𝑟𝑢𝑛 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡   28.69% 48.06% 
Note: Effect of democracy on government final consumption as a percentage of GDP, using my 
regional democracy instrument. In all specifications I control for country and year fixed effects. Each 
time period in this table accounts for one year. Robust standards errors, clustered by country are 
reported in parentheses. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% 






Table 7: 2SLS - Effects of democracy on government consumption – 5 
Years Lag 








































































𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑠 
    
















     
𝐹 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑥𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 18.27 15.68 17.54 15.52 
𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 0.1101 0.1233 0.2717 0.3362 
𝑂𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 1192 1131 1176 1116 
𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠 157 147 156 146 
𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑠 116    
𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔 − 𝑟𝑢𝑛 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡   30.10% 47.49% 
Note: Effect of democracy on government final consumption as a percentage of GDP, using my 
regional democracy instrument. In all specifications I control for country and year fixed effects. Each 
time period in this table accounts for five years. Robust standards errors, clustered by country are 
reported in parentheses. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% 





Figure 1: Average world democracy. This line graph plots the non-weighted average 
worldwide democracy from 1960 to 2017 by considering my binary 𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐 variable, which 
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Figure 2: Average democracy across regions. These line graphs plot the non-weighted 
average democracy across all 7 regions from 1960 to 2017 by considering my binary 𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐 
variable, which assigns 𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 1 for democracies and 𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 0 for nondemocracies. The scale 









































































































































































Figure 3: Average government consumption and 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦2. Each dot yields the non-weighted 














Figure 4: Average government consumption and 𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐. Each dot yields the non-weighted 















































































Algorithm for the 𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐 variable 
I construct my binary 𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐 variable using Polity IV and Freedom House as my main 
sources. I also use Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland’s (2010) - henceforth CGV - and Boix-
Miller-Rosato’s (2018) – henceforth BMR – as secondary sources, to resolve cases where 
both or one of the primary sources is missing12. At least one of these measures is present for 
191 countries over the 1960-2017. These countries are only considered after becoming 
independent or assuming their current form. Germany, which, following common practice, is 
assigned Federal Republic of Germany’s observed 𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐 values prior to the country’s 
reunification, is the only exception.  
My democracy dummy variable, 𝐷𝑖𝑡 ∈ {0,1}, is mostly built according to Acemoglu et 
al.’s (2019) rules, as follows: 
1. “We code a country/year observation as democratic ( 𝐷𝑖𝑡= 1) if its 
Freedom House status is “Free” or “Partially Free” and its Polity score 
is positive. This constitutes the bulk of the variation in our democracy 
measure”.    
  
2. “For small countries which only appear in the Freedom House sample, 
we code an observation as democratic if its Freedom House status is 
“Free” or “Partially Free,” and either CGV or BMR code it as 
democratic. There is overwhelming agreement between Freedom 
House, CGV and BMR in all such cases, making our coding 
straightforward”13. 
 
                                                             
12“CGV code a period as democratic when the chief executive is chosen by popular election (directly or 
indirectly), the legislature is popularly elected, there are multiple parties competing in the election, and an 
“alternation in power under electoral rules identical to the ones that brought the incumbent to office takes place.” 
BMR update Przeworski et al. (2000) and add the additional qualification that only instances in which more than 
50% of the male population are allowed to vote are coded as democracies”. 
13 “The only ambiguous case is Samoa, which is coded as “Free” since 1989 by Freedom House, while CGV and 
BMR both code it as nondemocratic.” I follow Acemoglu et al. (2019), who consider the latter coding because 
“rulers in Samoa have a long tenure and are appointed to office for life”. Besides this particular case, there are 
some countries for which only Freedom House provides information for the years 2016 and 2017 (the CGV and 
BMR samples end in 2008 and 2015 respectively). These include Afghanistan, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, 
Bosnia & Herzegovina, Brunei Darussalam, Dominica, Grenada, Iceland, Iraq, Kiribati, Luxembourg, Maldives, 
Malta, Nauru, Palau, Samoa, Seychelles, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. 
Lucia, St. Vincent & Grens, Suriname, São Tomé & Príncipe, Tonga and Vanuatu. In all of these cases but 
Tonga’s the Freedom House indicator remains the same since 2008, so I just code a continuation of the regime in 
place since 2008. Given the lack of additional information, I also keep Tonga as nondemocracy. 
48 
 
3. “There is no information from Freedom House before 1972. For these 
years, we code a country as democratic if it has a positive Polity score 
and either CGV or BMR code it as democratic”14. 
 
4. “When both Freedom House and Polity are missing (174 observations 
for 16 countries), we rely on our secondary sources and code our 
measure manually”15. 
 
5. “We check that our coding scheme does not produce spurious 
transitions when countries enter or leave the Freedom House, Polity, 




I replicate Mulligan et al.’s (2004) procedure and take 1960 – 2017 averages at the 
country level for each variable. Taking those average observed values, I regress the log of 
average government consumption for each country on all other averaged right-hand side 
variables. My estimated coefficients for democracy become negative and not significant, as 
reported in Table A2. These results can be interpreted as evidence that country specific time-
invariant factors may confound the estimated impact of democracy on government 
consumption. Thus, using a fixed effects specification is crucial in the assessment of the effect 
under analysis. 
 
In addition, I also replicate my initial strategy using pooled OLS regressions and 
results are reported in Tables A3 and A4. Again, I do not find a significant and robust positive 
                                                             
14 “There are a few cases coded as nondemocracies by CGV and BMR with a positive Polity score. In these 
cases, the Polity score is always near zero and we code the observation as a nondemocracy”. 
15 “The first country is Antigua and Barbuda, which is coded as democratic following its independence in 1981. 
Barbados is set as democratic from its independence in 1966, until it enters the Freedom House sample in 1972 
and is coded as democratic. Germany, Iceland and Luxembourg are coded as always democratic. This matches 
the Freedom House coding once they enter into its sample. Kuwait is set to nondemocratic in 1961 and 1962, 
until it enters the Polity sample in 1963 and is also coded as nondemocratic. The Maldives are set as 
nondemocratic from its independence in 1965, until they enter the Freedom House sample in 1972 and is also 
coded as nondemocratic. Malta is set as democratic from its independence in 1964, until it enters the Freedom 
House sample in 1972 and is also coded as democratic. Nauru is set as democratic from its independence in 1968 
until it enters the Freedom House sample in 1972, remaining democratic. Syria is coded as nondemocratic in 
1960 when it was not in Polity’s sample. It remains nondemocratic in the Polity sample. Tonga is coded as 
nondemocratic since its independence. This matches the Freedom House coding when it enters the sample. 
Vietnam and Yemen are coded as always nondemocratic, but they are not in Polity and Freedom House prior to 
their unification. However, they were nondemocratic according to all secondary sources. Samoa is 
nondemocratic since its independence based on CGV and BMR for years in which Polity and Freedom House 
are missing. Finally, Zimbabwe is also nondemocratic in 1965-1969 according to our secondary sources.” 
16 “This is the case for Cyprus, Malaysia, Gambia and Guyana, which we handled manually. The particular 
coding of these countries does not affect our results. We follow most sources and code Cyprus as democratic 
after 1974. Malaysia is coded as nondemocratic throughout. Guyana is coded as nondemocratic between 1966 




effect of democracy on government consumption under this specification. The estimated 
impact when no lags of the dependent variable are taken is generally negative, though not 






























Table A1: World Bank Indicators - Original Sources  
Indicator Original Source 
General government final consumption 
expenditure (% of GDP) 
World Bank national accounts data and OECD 
National Accounts data files 
  
GDP per capita (constant 2010 US$) World Bank national accounts data and OECD 
National Accounts data files 
  
Population, total  (1) United Nations Population Division. World 
Population Prospects: 2017 Revision.  
(2) Census reports and other statistical 
publications from national statistical offices  
(3) Eurostat: Demographic Statistics  
(4) United Nations Statistical Division. Population 
and Vital Statistics Report (various years) 
(5) U.S. Census Bureau: International Database 
(6) Secretariat of the Pacific Community: Statistics 
and Demography Programme. 
  
Population ages 65 and above (& of total) World Bank staff estimates based on age/sex 
distributions of United Nations Population 
Division's World Population Prospects: 2017 
Revision. 
  
Population ages 0-14 (% of total) World Bank staff estimates based on age/sex 
distributions of United Nations Population 
Division's World Population Prospects: 2017 
Revision. 
  
Urban population (% of total) United Nations Population Division. World 
Urbanization Prospects: 2018 Revision. 
  
Trade (% of GDP) World Bank national accounts data, and OECD 
National Accounts data files. 













Table A2: Cross-country regressions 
  𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦2 






























𝑅 − 𝑠𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑  0.2842 0.2805 
𝑂𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 168 157 
Note: Effect of democracy on government final consumption as a percentage of GDP. Robust 
standards errors are reported in parentheses. Both regressions include a constant term (not 
shown). * denotes significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level and *** 



















Table A3: Pooled OLS regressions – 1 Year Lag 
  1 Year Lags Model 
 𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐  𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦2  𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐  𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦2  
  































































    
𝑅 − 𝑠𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑  0.2145 0.2094 0.9098 0.9069 
𝑂𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 6777 6414 6750 6389 
Note: Pooled OLS regressions in order to estimate the effect of democracy on government final 
consumption as a percentage of GDP. Each time period in this table accounts for one year. 
Robust standards errors are reported in parentheses. All regressions include a constant term (not 
shown). * denotes significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level and *** 















Table A4: Pooled OLS regressions – 5 Years Lag 
  5 Years Lags Model 
 𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐  𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦2  𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐  𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦2  
  































































    
𝑅 − 𝑠𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑  0.2321 0.2255 0.6557 0.644 
𝑂𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 1299 1228 1277 1208 
Note: Pooled OLS regressions in order to estimate the effect of democracy on government final 
consumption as a percentage of GDP.  Each time period in this table accounts for one year. 
Robust standards errors are reported in parentheses. All regressions include a constant term (not 
shown). * denotes significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level and *** 
denotes significance at the 10% level.  
 
 
 
